Hazardous by Any Other Name: The Case for Reclassifying PFAS Textiles as Regulated Hazardous Material

| PFAS PASS Compliance Systems | PFASPass.com

Part Four of the Feeding the Machine Series | First published May 11, 2026

PFAS Drift In or Out™ is an original concept of PFAS PASS™. First published May 11, 2026. All rights reserved. This article constitutes independent research and does not constitute legal advice.

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What Is Already True in Law

The EPA has classified PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act — Superfund. The EPA proposed that designation in 2022 and finalized it in 2024, with the rule taking effect July 8, 2024. The designation was challenged, and in September 2025 the EPA confirmed it would retain it. PFOA and PFOS are, under federal law, hazardous substances.

A garment treated with PFAS chemistry containing PFOA or PFOS is therefore a garment containing a federally classified hazardous substance. When that garment is disposed of — thrown in a trash bag, dropped in a donation bin, placed in a recycling collection box — it is being handled as general solid waste. Not as regulated hazardous material. Not with the chain of custody documentation, the licensed disposal pathway, or the remediation liability framework that Superfund classification requires of other hazardous substances.

This is not a policy argument about what the law should say. It is an observation about what the law already says and what the industry has not done about it.

The reclassification argument is not novel. The classification already exists. What does not exist is its application to the textile waste stream. That gap — between what the law says and what the industry is doing — is the argument.

I am making it from operational experience, not theory. As the former managing partner of a green deconstruction, demolition, and hazardous material salvage company, I have managed regulated hazardous material streams. I know what licensed hazmat disposal requires. I know what chain of custody documentation looks like. I know what happens when hazardous material enters a disposal stream it was not designed for. And I know that what is currently happening to billions of PFAS-contaminated garments at end of life in this country is none of those things.

Part One — What Happens to PFAS Textiles at End of Life

There are four end-of-life pathways for a PFAS-contaminated garment. None of them are currently managed as the hazardous material event they are.

Landfill. The majority of discarded textiles in the United States enter landfill as general solid waste. At landfill, PFAS leaches from the fabric into the surrounding soil and groundwater. PFAS does not break down. It does not attenuate over time. It accumulates. Every PFAS-contaminated garment that enters a landfill is a slow-release contamination source for the groundwater beneath and around that site for decades. Landfill operators are not required to manage PFAS textile waste differently from any other solid waste because it is classified as general solid waste. The Superfund classification of the substances it contains has not been applied to the product.

Incineration. Textiles that are not landfilled are frequently incinerated. PFAS chemistry survives incineration at conventional temperatures. It does not combust into harmless byproducts. It concentrates in the ash produced by incineration — ash that is itself a regulated hazardous material in some jurisdictions but is handled inconsistently. PFAS also releases through incinerator smokestacks, entering the air and depositing onto soil and water in the surrounding area. Incineration does not destroy PFAS. It redistributes it.

Recycling. Textile recycling claims are made by brands and retailers at significant scale and with significant marketing investment. Consumers are told to bring their old garments to collection bins. Those garments, if PFAS-contaminated, contaminate the recovered fiber stream. PFAS-contaminated recycled fiber becomes PFAS-contaminated recycled product. The contamination does not stop at the recycling bin — it continues into whatever the recycled material becomes. Brands making recyclability claims on PFAS-contaminated textiles are not solving a disposal problem. They are creating a compounded contamination problem while collecting marketing credit for sustainability.

Export. A significant volume of discarded Western textiles is exported to developing countries — Ghana, Chile, Pakistan, Bangladesh — where it enters local markets, waste streams, and ultimately soil and water systems. PFAS textile waste exported from the United States enters foreign disposal systems with even less regulatory oversight than domestic ones. The contamination does not stop at the port of export. PFAS is a global problem in part because PFAS textiles are a global waste stream.

Part Two — The Classification Logic That Already Exists

Superfund’s hazardous substance classification carries specific legal consequences. A party who releases a hazardous substance into the environment — or whose actions result in such a release — can be held liable for the costs of remediation. The liability framework is well established. It has been applied to industrial sites, manufacturing facilities, and military installations for decades.

The application to textiles requires connecting three points that are individually established in law:

Point One: PFOA and PFOS are federally classified hazardous substances under Superfund.

Point Two: A garment treated with PFAS chemistry containing PFOA or PFOS contains a federally classified hazardous substance.

Point Three: When that garment enters landfill, incineration, or recycling, it releases or risks releasing that hazardous substance into the environment.

The chain is unbroken. The classification exists. The release mechanism is documented. The liability framework is established. What has not happened is the formal application of that chain to the textile product category — and the consequent requirement that PFAS-contaminated textiles be managed as regulated hazardous material at end of life.

The party responsible for establishing and enforcing that reclassification is the EPA. The party responsible for funding the disposal infrastructure consequences of that reclassification is the party that created the hazardous waste — the chemical manufacturers who produced the PFAS chemistry and the brands that deployed it in consumer products at scale.

PFAS Drift In or Out™ applies here with particular force. A PFAS-contaminated garment that entered US commerce through a regulated state — imported through California or New York ports, distributed through regulated state infrastructure, branded by a company headquartered in a regulated state — carries its hazmat status to whatever disposal stream it ultimately enters, regardless of where that disposal occurs. The brand headquartered in California whose PFAS-treated garments are discarded in Alabama landfills does not escape liability because Alabama has not enacted PFAS regulations. The garment Drifted In through a regulated jurisdiction. The hazardous substance classification attached at that point. The disposal consequences follow.

Part Three — The Recycling Fraud Argument

The recycling claim on a PFAS-contaminated textile is not a greenwashing problem in the conventional sense. It is not simply that the claim is false — that the brand is overstating its environmental credentials. It is that the claim is actively harmful in a way that conventional greenwashing is not.

When a consumer is told a garment is recyclable and places it in a textile recycling collection, they are being instructed to direct hazardous material into infrastructure that cannot safely process it. The recycling infrastructure is not designed to handle PFAS contamination. It does not test incoming material for PFAS content. It does not have the filtration, containment, or disposal protocols for hazardous material. It processes what it receives into recovered fiber — and that recovered fiber carries the PFAS contamination forward into whatever product it becomes.

This is not a marginal concern. The volume of PFAS-contaminated textiles being directed into recycling streams under brand-promoted recyclability programs is significant and growing. Every major fast fashion brand and every major outdoor gear brand with a take-back program is, if their products contain PFAS, directing hazardous material into infrastructure that contaminates the recovered material stream.

The legal theory is distinct from greenwashing. The claim is not simply false advertising. The claim causes affirmative harm — it directs hazardous material into an inappropriate disposal pathway, contaminating that pathway and perpetuating the contamination downstream. The damages extend beyond the consumer who was misled to the entire recycled material stream that is now contaminated.

The FTC Green Guides regulate environmental marketing claims. State consumer protection statutes provide additional vehicles. Environmental liability frameworks address the contamination consequences. The recycling fraud argument sits at the intersection of all three and has not been assembled in any current PFAS filing.

Part Four — Extended Producer Responsibility and Its Current Failure

Extended Producer Responsibility frameworks are the regulatory mechanism designed to make producers responsible for the end-of-life consequences of their products. California passed the Responsible Textile Recovery Act of 2024. The European Union reached a provisional agreement in February 2025 on mandatory EPR for textiles at EU level. These frameworks are real, advancing, and consequential.

But they are built on an assumption that must be challenged: that PFAS-contaminated textiles are recyclable waste whose end-of-life costs can be managed through a Producer Responsibility Organization and redirected into collection and recycling infrastructure.

They cannot. PFAS-contaminated textiles are not recyclable waste. They are hazardous material. The EPR frameworks currently advancing treat PFAS textile waste as a circularity problem — a material that can be collected, sorted, and recovered into new products. The hazardous substance classification of the PFAS they contain makes that treatment legally and practically incorrect.

The correction required is not the elimination of EPR for textiles. EPR is the right framework for producer accountability in this space. The correction is that EPR for PFAS-contaminated textiles must treat those textiles as regulated hazardous material requiring licensed disposal — not recyclable waste requiring collection and processing. The cost differential between licensed hazmat disposal and conventional textile recycling is significant. That differential is the liability that chemical manufacturers and fashion brands have been avoiding by keeping PFAS-contaminated textiles classified as general solid waste.

Making that differential visible — and assigning it to the producers who created it — is the EPR amendment argument. It is not in any current PFAS filing. It should be in every future one.

Part Five — What Reclassification Requires and Who Pays for It

Reclassifying PFAS-contaminated textiles as regulated hazardous material at end of life has operational consequences that are significant and calculable. From my experience managing hazardous material streams in demolition and salvage operations, the requirements are:

Identification and documentation. Every PFAS-contaminated garment entering the disposal stream must be identified, documented, and tracked through a chain of custody from point of disposal to licensed disposal facility. This requires testing infrastructure at the point of collection, documentation systems for chain of custody, and trained personnel capable of managing regulated material.

Licensed disposal pathways. PFAS-contaminated textiles cannot enter conventional landfill or conventional incineration under a hazmat classification. They require licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities capable of handling PFAS — of which there are currently very few in the United States. The disposal infrastructure does not yet exist at the scale required. Building it is the cost that chemical manufacturers and fashion brands should be required to fund.

Remediation of existing contamination. Every landfill that has received PFAS-contaminated textiles as general solid waste — which is effectively every landfill in the country that has received textile waste over the past several decades — is a site where PFAS is leaching into surrounding soil and groundwater. The remediation of those sites is a consequence of the misclassification of PFAS textile waste as general solid waste. The liability for that remediation belongs to the parties who created the hazardous material and the parties who should have ensured its proper disposal.

PFAS Drift In or Out™ applies to every element of this cost. The brands and chemical manufacturers whose products entered US commerce through regulated states — which encompasses the vast majority of the US fashion supply chain — cannot disclaim the disposal liability on the grounds that disposal occurred in an unregulated state. The hazmat classification followed the product from its entry into regulated commerce. The disposal liability is not bounded by the location of the landfill.

The Bottom Line

The classification already exists. The liability framework already exists. The disposal consequences are already happening — in every landfill, every incinerator, every recycling stream receiving PFAS-contaminated textiles. The only thing missing is the application of what the law already says to the product category it applies to.

PFAS-contaminated textiles are hazardous material. They are being treated as general solid waste. The parties responsible for creating that hazardous material — the chemical manufacturers who made the chemistry and the brands who deployed it at scale — are not paying for its disposal. Communities, municipalities, and taxpayers are absorbing the cost through contaminated groundwater, remediation expenses, and the absence of filtration infrastructure.

That is the argument. It does not require a new legal theory. It requires applying an existing one to a product category that has been excluded from it — not because the law does not apply, but because no one has yet made the case.

PFAS Drift In or Out™ is an original concept of PFAS PASS™. First published May 11, 2026. All rights reserved. This article constitutes independent research and does not constitute legal advice. Plaintiff counsel seeking case gap analysis or retained expert engagement should visit https://pfaspass.com/media-press/

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The Feeding the Machine Series

Part One — Feeding the Machine: What the Petroleum Crisis Revealed About Everything You Were Sold

Part Two — What PFAS Litigation Has Won, What It Has Missed, and What the Laundry Pathway Changes

Part Three — 158 Million Americans, One Washing Machine at a Time: The Science of the Laundry Pathway

Part Four — Hazardous by Any Other Name: The Case for Reclassifying PFAS Textiles as Regulated Hazardous Material

Part Five — Who Pays to Clean It Up: Making Fashion and Petroleum Fund the Infrastructure Their Production Model Created

Part Six — Feeding the Machine: The Legal Case — The Petroleum Industry’s Compounded Liability

Part Seven — Statute of Limitations vs. Expired Window: How Sellers and Banks Hide Behind Refund Timelines to Bury Post-Sale PFAS Claims

Full Series Hub →